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Chapman: Chapman: Punitive Damages

PUNITIVE DAMAGES AS A
SOLUTION TO DRUNKEN DRIVING
Wheeler v. Evans'
The number one cause of highway fatalities and accidents in the United
States today is drunk driving. 2 Public outrage over the death, destruction
and anguish caused by drunk driving has led to a search for new methods
of combatting this problem. In the past, society has relied on criminal sanctions. However, these criminal sanctions have not been effective in controlling
the problems presented by intoxicated drivers. In response, state legislatures
have begun to pass legislation toughening drunk driving laws by increasing
fines and revoking driver's licenses. Another response to the drunk driving
problem has been the institution of rehabilitative programs for the drunk
driver. Organizations such as Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), Remove Intoxicated Drivers-U.S.A. (RID), and Students Against Drunk Driving (SADD) have started extensive campaigns to create an awareness of this
3
problem and to promote programs designed to prevent drinking and driving.
Finally, courts are beginning to impose punitive damages against those found
guilty of driving while intoxicated.
This Note will focus on the imposition of punitive damages against the
drunk driver as a response to the drunk driving problem. The court in Wheeler
v. Evans,4 decided to allow the imposition of punitive damages against drunk
drivers who injure another person in an automobile accident. This Note will
examine the policy reasons behind the court's holding and the effect of that
decision. Within the analysis, decisions of other jurisdictions will be evaluated
and compared to the Missouri decision, and the advantages and disadvantages
of the differing views will be discussed.
1. 708 S.W.2d 677 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
2. Drunken driving is the cause of over half the United States' highway
fatalities (approximately 25,000 deaths per year). Drunk driving is the primary cause
of death for people between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four. Further, there is a
fifty percent chance that a person of the general population will be involved in an
alcohol-related accident in his or her lifetime. Note, Punitive Damages in DrunkDriving Cases: A CallFor a Strict Standardand LegislativeAction, 19 SUFFOLK U.L.
REv. 607, 608 (1985).

3. Meeting the Drunk Driver Head-On, CoNsumERs' REsEARcH MAG., Aug.
1983, at 26. The primary stimuli for the formation of these groups have been personal
tragedy and a concern for family and friends. The goal of these groups is to create
nationwide animosity towards driving while intoxicated. Id. at 28.
4. 708 S.W.2d 677 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
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On the evening of March 2, 1981, the plaintiff, Sue Wheeler, was struck
from behind by a vehicle driven by defendant Ralph Evans. The defendant
claimed the plaintiff's car was not "obediently" situated on the road because
it extended into his lane on a four lane highway. 5 After the accident, the
defendant was given a breathalyzer test in which he registered a blood alcohol
content of .12 percent. Under Missouri law, that level of intoxication was
sufficient to render the defendant legally intoxicated. 6 The plaintiff brought
suit against Evans for medical expenses, lost wages and punitive damages as
a result of injuries she suffered in the accident.7 Although the circuit court
entered a judgment on a jury verdict for the plaintiff for medical expenses
and lost wages, 8 she appealed the court's judgment, claiming the court erred
in refusing to submit to the jury a punitive damage instruction. The plaintiff
asserted that the defendant's driving while legally intoxicated constituted a
"conscious disregard for the safety of others" that warranted a punitive
damages instruction. 9 The Missouri appellate court upheld the circuit court's
finding that a punitive damage instruction was not warranted in this particular situation. However, the court stated that a punitive damage instruction
could be submitted to the jury under the right circumstances. If a plaintiff
could prove: 1) reckless conduct by the defendant (driving while intoxicated),
and 2) causation (that the defendant's intoxication caused him to collide with
the plaintiff's car), then a punitive damage instruction could be submitted
to the jury.10 While the plaintiff in Wheeler presented evidence that the
defendant was legally intoxicated (proof of reckless conduct), she did not
present additional evidence that the defendant's reckless conduct in driving
while intoxicated caused the accident."
5. While proceeding west on the highway, the plaintiff prepared to make i

left-hand turn into the entrance of a Wal-Mart parking lot and was struck from

behind by the defendant's vehicle. At this particular point on the highway, there were
five separate lanes: two eastbound, two westbound and a center left-turn lane. The

plaintiff claimed she was in the center lane, but the defendant testified that he rearended the plaintiff's car while he was still in the second westbound lane of traffic.
Id. at 678. The evidence in the case revealed that the plaintiff was not "obediently
positioned" on the highway. Id. at 681.

6. A blood alcohol content (BAC) of .10 percent or more leads to a presumption of legal intoxication in Missouri. Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.037 (1986). Most
other states also consider drivers to be intoxicated when their BAC is .10 percent or
greater. Note, supra note 2, at 607 n.3.
7. Wheeler, 708 S.W.2d at 679. The plaintiff testified that she suffered headaches, pain in her neck, back, shoulders, arms, right leg and hip and experienced

numbness in her arms, fingers and toes. Because of these injuries, plaintiff claimed
her work as a waitress, her housework and her recreational activities were impeded.
Id.

8. Id. at 682. The jury returned a verdict of $8,572 for medical expenses
and lost wages. Id.
9. Id. at 679.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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Punitive damages, also known as exemplary damages, have been defined
as damages, other than compensatory or nominal damages, awarded against
a person to punish him for outrageous conduct arising from his evil motive
or reckless indifference to others. 12 Punitive damages essentially are a windfall
13
to the plaintiff, and thus the award is not a "matter of right." If the court
determines that the evidence is sufficient to submit the question of punitive
damages to the jury, the jury has discretion to either grant or deny the
14
damages and to determine the particular amount of the award. All jurisdictions agree that something more than the mere commission of a tort is
necessary to allow awarding punitive damages to the plaintiff. There must
be circumstances involving aggravation, outrage or spite on the part of the
defendant."s Most jurisdictions require that the defendant have acted with
malice or with a fraudulent motive to justify a punitive damages award, or
with such conscious disregard for the interests of others that he could be
said to have acted willfully and wantonly.16 A few jurisdictions, while not
imposing punitive damages for mere negligence, have expanded "conscious7
disregard for the interests of others" to include extreme or gross negligence.
12. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) oF TORTS § 908 (1977). Section 908 defines punitive damages:
(1) Punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory or nominal
damages, awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct
and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the future.
(2) Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous,
because of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the
rights of others. In assessing punitive damages, the trier of fact can properly
consider the character of the defendant's act, the nature and extent of the
harm to the plaintiff that the defendant caused or intended to cause and
the wealth of the defendant.
Id.
13. W. PROSSER & W. KEEroN, THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 14 (5th ed. 1984).
14. Id.; see Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., 278 Md. 524, 366 A.2d 7 (1976)
(trier of fact has discretion to grant or deny punitive damages once legal basis exists);
Malco, Inc. v. Midwest Aluminum Sales, Inc., 14 Wis. 2d 57, 109 N.W.2d 516 (1961)
(jury had discretion to determine whether to allow punitive damages).
15.

W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 13, at 9-10.

16. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 13, at 10; see, e.g., Brooks v.
Wootton, 355 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1966) (willful or wanton conduct is the standard for
punitive damages); Sebastian v. Wood, 246 Iowa 94, 66 N.W.2d 841 (1954) (driving
in wanton and reckless manner was sufficient to support an award of punitive damages); Dorn v. Wilmarth, 254 Or. 236, 458 P.2d 942 (1969) (driving after voluntarily
consuming alcohol to excess was wanton and reckless and supported an award of
punitive damages).
17. W. PRossER & W. KEETON, supra note 13, at 10-11; see, e.g., Sebastian
v. Wood, 246 Iowa 94, 66 N.W.2d 841 (1954) (punitive damages were allowed upon
finding of gross negligence); Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Robertson, 125 Tex. 4,
79 S.W.2d 830 (1935) (gross negligence, when defined as "conscious indifference,"
could be adequate grounds for a punitive damages award).
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The theory behind punitive damages has been continually attacked and
disfavored by courts in many jurisdictions. Some courts argue that awarding
punitive damages provides an undeserved windfall for the plaintiff because
he has already been compensated for his loss through compensatory damages. 8 Proponents of punitive damages argue that attorney's fees may consume a large portion of the compensatory award and punitive damages are
therefore needed to fully compensate the plaintiff for his losses.' 9
Other critics maintain that juries are given too much unguided discretion
in determining the amount of a punitive damage award. 20 Because punitive
damages are parasitic in nature, they are only to be awarded if compensatory
damages are also awarded. 2' However, juries sometimes blur the two, particularly when the damages are vague, and as a result award only nominal
compensatory damages with large punitive awards.22 This problem can be
remedied by stricter judicial supervision of the jury.
Finally, critics of punitive damages contend that the Constitution prohibits punishing a civil defendant who is also accused of a crime. These
critics assert that the possibility of both criminal and civil sanctions against
an offender violates the Constitution's protection against double jeopardy.2
However, courts have generally dismissed this argument, noting that the
double jeopardy argument only applies to subsequent criminal prosecutions,
not to a prosecution followed by a civil proceeding. 24
Many jurisdictions, including Missouri, feel that the policy reasons in
favor of awarding punitive damages outweigh the criticisms. One common
justification for punitive damages is to punish the wrongdoer for his outrageous conduct when criminal laws fail to adequately punish him. Most
drunk driving accidents involving death or serious bodily injury are criminally
prosecuted. However, many drunk driving accidents cause only minor personal injuries which do not warrant criminal punishment. Further, a district
attorney may exercise his discretion so as to decide that even though the
offense is a crime, it is not serious enough to warrant a criminal prosecution.?
Punitive damages help to punish the offender in these instances when he
would otherwise not be criminally punished.? Those opposed to awarding
18. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF RMEEDS § 3.9, at 219 (1973).
19. Id. at 220.
20. Id. at 219.
21. C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 83, at 293 (1935).
22. D. DOBBS, supra note 18, at 209.
23. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 21, § 77, at 276-77. The fifth amendment of
the United States Constitution states that no person shall "be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ... " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
24. Note, supra note 2, at 613 n.32.
25. J. GmaARoi & J. KMCHER, PuNrrIVE DAMAGES LAW & PRACTICE § 2.02,
at 6 (1985).
26. Note, Insurance Against Punitive Damages in Drunk Driving Cases, 69
MARQ.

L. REv. 308 (1986).
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punitive damages in civil cases argue that if the actions of a person do not
justify a criminal prosecution he should not suffer punishment. 27
An additional justification for the imposition of punitive damages is to
deter the offender and others from engaging in similar conduct.2 Although
the deterrent effect of awarding punitive damages has not been proven conclusively, it does serve as a signal to the defendant and others that driving
while intoxicated may warrant severe civil penalties. 29 The effectiveness of
punitive damages as a deterrent may depend on the public's knowledge of
the possible consequences. Proponents argue that the public is knowledgeable
about punitive damages. 30 Opponents argue that the deterrent effect is minimal for two reasons: first, because society is ignorant about the nature of
punitive damages; and second, because once the drunk driver is intoxicated
31
he is unable to rationally choose whether or not to drive.
A third justification offered for imposing punitive damage awards against
an offender is to reimburse the plaintiff for actual expenses not covered by
compensatory damages, such as attorney's fees and court costs. 32 The availability of punitive damages allows and induces plaintiffs to bring actions
which they might not otherwise pursue due to litigation expenses. 33 Critics
maintain that this is a weak justification, and argue that those who find fault
with the present system of civil litigation and its allocation of expenses should
34
attack the problem directly, not indirectly through punitive damage awards.
After evaluating the arguments for and against imposing punitive damages, an overwhelming majority of states today accept the use of punitive
35
damages and deem it to be a necessary part of the civil litigation system.

27. J. GmARDi & J. KiRCHER, supra note 25, at 6.
28. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 11, at 9.
29. See Note, supra note 26, at 308.
30. Morris, Punitive Damages in PersonalInjury Cases, 21 OHIo ST. L.J.
216, 226 (1960).
31. J. GmaADI & J. KiRcHER, supra note 25, § 2.09, at 22-23.
32. D. Doas, supra note 18, § 3.9, at 205.
33. J. GmARDi & J. KRCHER, supra note 25, § 2.11, at 25.
34. J. GHmIiDi & J. KIRCHER, supra note 25, § 2.11, at 26.
35. Some courts, however, limit the imposition of punitive damages, permiting
punitive damages only as an enhanced form of compensation to the plaintiff. See
e.g., Tedesco v. Maryland Casualty Co., 127 Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 357 (1941) (compensation was the purpose of imposing punitive damages and the award could not
exceed litigation expenses less taxable costs); Wise v. Daniel, 221 Mich. 229, 190
N.W. 746 (1922) (punitive damages were allowed to enlarge compensatory damages,
but they were not in a separate category); Bixby v. Dunlap, 56 N.H. 456 (1876)
(enhanced compensatory damages were allowed as opposed to punitive damages).
In Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska and Washington, the courts have completely rejected the awarding of punitive damages. See McCoy v. Arkansas Natural
Gas Co., 175 La. 487, 143 So. 383, cert. denied, 287 U.S. 661 (1932) (punitive damages
allowed only if a statute expressly authorized the imposition for a particular wrong);
City of Lowell v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 313 Mass. 257, 47 N.E.2d 265
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A very important issue in the area of punitive damages is the role of
insurance and whether the offenders or their insurance companies will pay
punitive damages. While most courts recognize that a party may insure itself
against punitive damages, 3 6 some courts prohibit an insurance company from
providing coverage for punitive damages. 37 In determining whether to allow
coverage for punitive damages, courts confront two questions: 1) whether
the language of the insurance contract is sufficiently broad to cover punitive
damages; and 2) whether public policy should permit recovery for punitive
38
damages.
An analysis of the insurability of punitive damages must begin with the
language of the insurance policy. While most policies do not employ the
terms "punitive damages" or "exemplary damages," some policies do suggest that coverage does include punitive damages by providing coverage on
"all sums" or "all damages" for which the insured shall become liable.3 9
Although this language may seem too broad or ambiguous, most courts
interpret this general language in the insured's favor and allow for coverage.4
In Crull v. Gleb,41 a Missouri appellate court followed the minority view and
held that a general public liability insurance policy does not include coverage
for punitive damages. Assuming the insurance contract between the offender
and the insurer contemplates coverage of punitive damages, public policy
issues must also be addressed. In Northwestern National Casualty Co. v.
McNulty4 2 (the leading case against insurance covering punitive damages), a
Florida appellate court stated that allowing coverage for punitive damages
would greatly undermine the punishment and deterrent objectives of punitive
damages. 43 The court also stated that "where a person is able to insure himself
(1943) (exemplary damages allowed only if authorized by statute); Abel v. Conover,
170 Neb. 926, 104 N.W.2d 684 (1960) (compensation is the basis for recovery of
damages in civil cases, so punitive damages are not allowed); Spokane Truck & Dray
Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 25 P. 1072 (1891) (punitive damages found to be unsound,
unfair and dangerous in practice).
In the state of Indiana, courts allow the imposition of punitive damages, but
not if the defendant in the civil action is also subject to criminal prosecution for the
same act. See Nicholson's Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. Schramn, 164 Ind. App. 598,
330 N.E.2d 785 (1975).
36. Note, supra note 2, at 624; see Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins.
Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
37. See Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir.
1962).
38. Note, supra note 26, at 320.
39. See, e.g., Lazenby, 214 Tenn. at 648, 383 S.W.2d at 5.
40. K. REDDEN, PuNivE DAmAGas § 9.3, at 685 (1980).
41. 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
42. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962). Defendant, who was insured, lost control
of his car while intoxicated and severely injured the plaintiff. The plaintiff was
awarded punitive damages and the insurance company protested its liability for the
punitive damages. Id. at 433.
43. Id.
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against punishment he gains a freedom of misconduct inconsistent with the
establishment of sanctions against such misconduct." 44
A leading case supporting insurance against punitive damage awards is
Brown v. Maxey.45 The court in Brown emphasized the importance as a major
public policy objective of maintaining freedom to contract. "Public policy
favors the enforcement of insurance contracts according to their terms, where
the insurance company accepts the premium and reasonably represents or
implies that coverage is implied.""6 The Brown court also stated that insurance coverage for punitive damages could be a successful deterrent in that
insurance premiums might rise after punitive damages have been imposed,
insurance may become unavailable after the imposition of a punitive award,
or the award may exceed the policy coverage.47
Because of the increase in civil litigation involving drunk driving incidents, most jurisdictions have addressed the issue of whether or not a drunk
driver may be held liable for punitive damages. 4 Three different approaches
have evolved from the jurisdictions that have ruled on this issue. Critical
considerations in these three theories are the plaintiff's burden of proof
concerning the defendant's standard of care and the defendant's state of
mind at the time the tort was committed.
Jurisdictions that have responded negatively to the assessment of punitive
damages against drunk drivers have adopted the more conservative view
requiring proof that the defendant acted with ill will, malice, evil motive or
fraudulent purposes. 49 Jurisdictions applying this standard require that the
50
defendant's state of mind be established independently from his conduct.
The fact that the defendant acted in a certain manner does not by itself
establish his state of mind. Because the defendant's conduct cannot be used
to establish a malicious state of mind, independent evidence of malice must
44. Id. at 440.
45. 124 Wis. 2d 426, 369 N.W.2d 677 (1985). In considering the insurability
of punitive damages assessed against a landlord for failure to maintain his apartment
complex reasonably safe from fire, the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that the
policy language was sufficiently broad that the insured could reasonably have expected
to be covered for punitive damages. Id. at 445, 369 N.W.2d at 686.
46. Id. at 446, 369 N.W.2d at 687.
47. Id. at 447, 369 N.W.2d at 688.
48. Note, supra note 2, at 615-16 n.47.
49. The following jurisdictions follow the conservative view: American Sur.
Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1966); Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v.
McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962); Arnold v. State ex rel. Burton, 220 Ark. 25,
245 S.W.2d 818 (1952); Tedesco v. Maryland Casualty Co., 127 Conn. 533, 18 A.2d
357 (1941); Yesel v. Watson, 58 N.D. 524, 226 N.W. 624 (1929); Teska v. Atlantic
Nat'l Ins. Co., 59 Misc. 2d 615, 300 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1969); Detling v. Chockley, 70
Ohio St. 2d 134, 436 N.E.2d 208 (1982); Esmond v. Liscio, 209 Pa. Super. 200, 224
A.2d 793 (1966).
50. Chockley, 70 Ohio St. 2d at 136, 436 N.E.2d at 210.
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be introduced. This concept is known as actual malice and requires the
defendant to have had intent and deliberation in order to establish the requisite state of mind. From a practical standpoint, under this test punitive
damages are effectively precluded because proving malice outside the context
of specific conduct is extremely difficult in drunk driving cases. 5'
In Detling v. Chockley, 2 an Ohio court following the conservative view
stated that one who knowingly drives his automobile on the highway while
legally intoxicated is in violation of the state statute prohibiting driving while
intoxicated and is thereby negligent. However, the court held that an act of
mere negligence did not of itself demonstrate the degree of intention and
deliberation necessary to justify awarding punitive damages.53 The irony of
this position is that the more the defendant drinks the more intoxicated he
becomes, and he thus becomes increasingly less able to form the necessary
intent and deliberation required to prove actual malice. Thus, although the
defendant may be more dangerous and guilty of wrongdoing as his degree
of intoxication increases, it is more difficult to assess punitive damages against
him.5 4 This view disregards the societal need for harsher penalties to punish
the defendant and to deter others from driving while intoxicated.
Another approach followed in determining whether to award punitive
damages is more liberal and determines the propriety of imposing punitive
damages largely upon the conduct involved. 5 The defendant's conscious
wrongdoing may be "necessarily implied" from reckless conduct, 6 and the
defendant's state of mind is not viewed separately from his conduct. This
standard, known as legal malice, makes it easier for the plaintiff to get the
issue of punitive damages to the jury because the defendant's malicious
mental state can be implied from his reckless conduct in becoming intoxicated
and then driving.57 The plaintiff does not have to provide independent evidence of the defendant's state of mind in order to recover punitive damages.
In Taylor v. Superior Court,58 a California court held that one who
voluntarily consumes alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, know51. Comment, Punitive Damages and the Drunken Driver, 8 PEPPERDiNE L.
REv. 117, 139 (1980).
52. Chockley, 70 Ohio St. 2d 134, 436 N.E.2d 208 (1982).
53. Id. at 137, 436 N.E.2d at 211. No ill will or malicious motive toward the
plaintiff was present. Id.
54. Id.

55. See, e.g., Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 598 P.2d 854, 157
Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979); Ingram v. Pettit, 340 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1976); Svejcara v.
Whitman, 82 N.M. 739, 487 P.2d 167 (Ct. App. 1971).
56. Asher v. Broadway-Valentine Center, 691 S.W.2d 478, 485 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985).
57. See, e.g., MAI 10.01.
58. 24 Cal. 3d 890, 598 P.2d 854, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979) (in a personal
injury action against an intoxicated driver, plaintiff was awarded punitive damages

based on proof of defendant's voluntary intoxication).
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ing from the outset that he must thereafter drive an automobile, demonstrates
"such a conscious disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may
be called willful and wanton." 59 Thus, the intoxication of the defendant
motorist was in itself an adequate basis for an award of punitive damages
and no showing of actual malice or causation was required.
While a court following the pure liberal approach would hold a defen60
dant liable for punitive damages based solely on evidence of intoxication,
other jurisdictions, including the Taylor court, modify that approach by
requiring proof that the defendant voluntarily drank to the point of intoxication and knew from the outset that he would thereafter operate a motor
vehicle. 61 Under this approach the plaintiff would therefore be required to
prove that the defendant possessed an awareness of the probable consequences of his conduct. This requirement affords the defendant greater protection against unwarranted punitive damages than the pure liberal approach
would provide.
Although the liberal approach is the most advantageous to society in
that it curbs drunk driving accidents and fatalities, it is not without drawbacks. The defendant is afforded no protection when his intoxication might
not have been the cause of the accident. Also, because proof that the defendant was intoxicated is enough to sustain a punitive damage award, the
plaintiff is not required to produce any evidence of a culpable mental state.
This might allow the recovery of punitive damages in situations where it may
not be justified. The Taylor court distinguished its approach from the liberal
view by requiring evidence that the defendant knew that he would later be
operating a motor vehicle before a punitive damage award would be allowed.
A majority of courts have adopted a moderate approach allowing the
imposition of punitive damages in drunk driving cases by emphasizing the
defendant's conduct in proving legal malice, but also requiring proof of
62
causation (that the defendant's intoxication was the cause of the accident).
A recent decision by the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District
63
appears to follow this moderate approach.
The court in Wheeler upheld the circuit court's finding that a punitive
damage instruction was not warranted. 64 In so holding, the court followed
59. Id. at 894-95, 598 P.2d at 859, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
60. An example of a jurisdiction which adopted the pure liberal approach is
Ingram v. Pettit, 340 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1976). In Ingram, the plaintiff's car was struck
by the defendant from the rear while stopped at an intersection. Although the defendant was legally intoxicated, he was not driving at an excessive speed, nor did he
swerve or veer out of his lane of traffic. Id. at 923. The court held that the voluntary
act of driving while intoxicated was sufficient proof of malice to warrant awarding
punitive damages. Id. at 924.
61. Taylor, 24 Cal. 3d at 894-95, 598 P.2d at 559, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
62. Wheeler, 708 S.W.2d at 677.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 679.
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the moderate approach allowing malice to be implied by conduct but requiring proof of causation before punitive damages could be awarded. The
court, following the legal malice theory, stated that the defendant's conscious
wrongdoing could be "necessarily implied" from his reckless conduct; 65 getting behind the wheel with a blood alcohol content above the legal limit is
conduct which can imply conscious wrongdoing and becomes negligence per
se. 66 However, the court indicated that a person could not be punished solely
because he was drunk or is an alcoholic. 67 Thus, the court also required proof
that the defendant's intoxication caused the accident in order to submit the
issue of punitive damages to the jury. 6 The plaintiff in Wheeler argued that
proof of causation was not required, claiming that the submission of the
punitive damages instruction to the jury was a logical extension of Smith v.
Sayles,69 an earlier Missouri case which addressed the issue of punitive damages and drunken driving. 70 Although the Sayles court did not adopt a standard of care (i.e., actual or legal malice) regarding punitive damages and
drunk driving, that court stated that the plaintiff must have prima facie
proof of the elements of punitive damages for a punitive damage instruction
to be submitted to the jury.7' In view of the Sayles decision, the Wheeler
court naturally included the element of causation as being required for punitive damages. The evidence in Wheeler did reveal that the defendant was
legally intoxicated, thus implying reckless conduct. However, the court held
that the plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence to prove that the defendant's intoxication caused him to rear-end the plaintiff's car. 72 Thus, a punitive damage instruction could not be submitted to the jury. Although the
fact that the defendant was legally intoxicated does not by itself establish
intoxication as the sole proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff,7 3 the
Wheeler court recognized that the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury may be proven through circumstantial evidence. The
court stated that in most cases, injuries sustained in an automobile collision
with a drunken driver may be directly attributable to the defendant's intox65. Id. at 680.
66. Id.; Bowman v. Heffon, 318 S.W.2d 269, 274 (Mo. 1958).
67. Wheeler, 708 S.W.2d at 680.
68. Id.
69. 637 S.W.2d 714 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). The appellate court in Sayles remanded the case for retrial because the plaintiff failed to submit the issue of punitive
damages to the jury in the circuit court action. Id.
70. Wheeler, 708 S.W.2d at 680 & n.1.
71. Sayles, 637 S.W.2d at 719. In Sayles, the plaintiff was not given the
opportunity in the circuit court to present evidence to warrant a punitive damage
award. In Wheeler, the plaintiff was allowed to present evidence but failed to meet
the prima facie burden.
72. Wheeler, 708 S.W.2d at 680 & n. 2.
73. Id.
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ication because intoxication generally causes reduced awareness and impairs
the ability of a driver to react to a particular situation. 74
However, the Wheeler court also stated that in cases where there is a
rear-end collision, 75 it is extremely unlikely that one can recover punitive
damages. Because of the particular factual situation in a rear-end collision,
the causal connection between a defendant's intoxication and a plaintiff's
injury is often too attenuated for a submission of punitive damages to the
jury. A drunk driver could be well within the speed limit, drive a straight
line and have a rear-end collision with a car stopped at an intersection because
of inattention rather than intoxication. 76 Thus in a case involving a rear-end
collision, the plaintiff must present additional evidence that intoxication caused
the defendant to rear-end the plaintiff.
The Wheeler court did not expressly state what additional evidence could
prove causation. However, in Ayala v. Farmer'sMutual Automobile Insur-

ance Company7 7 a factually similar case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court listed
several factors that could offer guidance in a future determination of whether
a defendant's intoxication was the cause of a collision. Items such as speed,
management and control of the car, position of the car on the road or
highway, whether the defendant kept a proper lookout, or any irregular or
abnormal driving might help prove causation and thus warrant the imposition
of punitive damages.28
The rationale of the Wheeler court's position on drunk driving and
punitive damages is fundamentally sound and achieves three laudable objectives. First, by allowing the imposition of punitive damages, it recognizes
that highway travellers have the right to be free from the erratic and abnormal
behavior of the drunken driver. Second, in furthering the goal of curbing
the drunk driving problem, it alleviates the difficult burden of proving actual
intent and deliberation of the defendant by adopting the legal malice theory.
74. Id. at 680 n.2.
75. The Wheeler court indicated that the facts in the case fell into an exception
known as the "very narrow rear-end exception." Id. at 681. The court distinguished
the facts in Wheeler from a similar case, Rustin v. Cook, 143 Ariz. App. 486, 694

P.2d 316 (1984). In Rustin, the court found that evidence of a rear-end collision
which occurred while the defendant was driving while intoxicated supports a finding

of acting with reckless indifference to the rights of others. Thus the Rustin court
allowed the imposition of punitive damages against the intoxicated driver. Id. at
,
694 P.2d at 316. However, the facts of Rustin are distinguishable from Wheeler, in

that the plaintiff in Rustin was "obediently" positioned on the road and was free
from negligence. Id. at

-,

694 P.2d at 316. In Wheeler, however, the court found

that the plaintiff was not "obediently" positioned to make a left turn, and thus not
free from
76.
77.
78.

negligence. Wheeler, 708 S.W.2d at 678.
Wheeler, at 680-81.
272 Wis. 629, 76 N.W.2d 563 (1956).
Id. at 640, 76 N.W.2d at 570.
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This provides plaintiffs with a better opportunity to recover punitive damages
than plaintiffs in jurisdictions following the conservative view. Third, it forces
the plaintiff to present a prima facie case including causation, which is not
always easily accomplished. This serves as a protective measure for a drunk
driver in those instances where his intoxication is not the cause of the injury
or collision. Thus, a person would not be punished solely because he was
drunk. Further, failing to require proof of causation makes the intoxicated
driver an insurer, to the extent of the amount of any punitive damages,
irrespective of any showing that his conduct in the operation of the automobile fell below that standard of care he owed the plaintiff.
Drunk driving has become a social problem of great proportion in the
United States..To stop the destruction created by drunk drivers, society must
develop responses that increase the punishment and deterrence that drunk
drivers are subjected to. Perhaps the most effective method of thwarting
drunk driving is through imposition of punitive damages. Intoxicated drivers
should be held liable for punitive damages notwithstanding the criticisms
against awarding such damages. In Wheeler v. Evans, a Missouri appellate
court adopted a standard that struck a balance between the liberal approach
of awarding punitive damages based upon proof of intoxication alone and
the conservative view which makes it virtually impossible to award punitive
damages. That moderate approach allowing a punitive damages award based
upon the defendant's reckless conduct with proof that the defendant's intoxication "caused" the collision accomplishes the goal of getting drunk
drivers off the road while affording some protection for defendants against
unreasonable punitive damages.
MARY NAN CAPMAN
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